

ALLOCATION OF ALLOWANCES GENERAL OVERVIEW

Michael Mehling

Deputy Director, CEEPR at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Background Reading



ICAP/PMR Handbook


Emissions Trading in Practice
2nd ed. (2021)

Chapter 5: “Distribute allowances” (pp. 97-122)




Available at:

https://icapcarbonaction.com/system/files/document/ets-handbook-2020_finalweb.pdf




The main methods of allocation



Allowance distribution through auctioning

- Different **auction designs** are available
 - Single-round vs. multiple-round
 - Sealed bid vs. open bid
 - Uniform price vs. pay-as-bid, etc.
- **Market oversight:** safeguard against collusion
- **Price controls possible:** floor/auction reserve price
- **Frequency and auction amounts** chosen so that the secondary market is disturbed as little as possible

Benchmarking: How to set the benchmark?



Benchmarking: How to determine the output?

$$\text{Allocation} = \text{Output} \\ * \text{BM} * \text{CF}$$

- **Output** (units of output produced):
 - **Historical output** during a given base period
 - **Standardized output** based on capacity and standard capacity utilization
 - **Projected output** (for new entrants)
 - Annual **output of the previous year**: dynamic or output-based allocation (“updating”)

Benchmarking: What should it be based on?

- Benchmark (tons of CO₂/unit of output) can be based on:
 - **Capacity**
(i.e. theoretical output rather than actual output)
 - **Production** (tons of cement, MWh of electricity)
 - Production, **but differentiated** for technology, fuel, quality of raw materials, plant size or age, climatic circumstances etc.
 - **Proxies**: e.g. heat benchmark, fuel benchmark
- Product-based benchmark is least distorting: but how to define a “product”?

$$\text{Allocation} = \text{Output} \\ * \text{BM} * \text{CF}$$

Grandfathering

- Seems simple at first – but the difficulties rest in the details:
 - **Data need** – collecting *historical* installation-level emissions data
 - **Time consistency** problem / perverse incentives if the base period is known in advance (firms realise that higher emissions during the base period will lead to more allocation in the future)
 - How to address **early action**?
 - Unplanned **outages** during the base period?
 - What about **new entrants**?

$$\text{Allocation} = \text{Emissions}_{\text{base year}} * CF$$

Choosing the right allocation method

- **Cost incidence:** who will eventually pay the carbon cost? Are firms able to pass on the carbon price? Is there a risk of creating windfall profits?
- **Competitiveness:** is the sector exposed to international competition? Is there a risk of “carbon leakage”, and will free allocation reduce this risk?
- **Compensation for stranded assets:** Does the carbon price devalue past investments? Should firms be compensated for this devaluation?
- **Buying support:** allocation a necessary evil to get stakeholders on board?
- **Practical considerations:** data need, administrative effort (both for designing and applying the rules), risk of fraud or perverse incentives, etc.

THANK YOU!



+1 202 550 9077



mmehling@mit.edu



mmehling.mit.edu